


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7 December 1979

Vietnam Report

No. 2157



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CONTENTS

PAGE

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

Importance of Hard-Core Militia and Self-Defense Units Stressed (Hai Duong; TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, Aug 79)	1
Need To Transform Districts Into 'Military Fortresses' Discussed (Dang Kinh; TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, Aug 79)	9
Dac Lac Village Said To Mop Up 'Armed Reactionaries' (Tran Le; TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, Aug 79)	28
Problems of Transportation at the Front Outlined (Nguyen An; TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, Aug 79)	36
'NHAN DAN' Reprints Laws in Force on Crimes, Property (Editorial Report)	44

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

IMPORTANCE OF HARD-CORE MILITIA AND SELF-DEFENSE UNITS STRESSED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 8, Aug 79 pp 32-38

[Article by Hai Duong: "Building and Consolidating the Hard-Core Combat Units of the Militia and Self-Defense Forces"]

[Text] The militia and self-defense forces are mass armed forces which are broadly organized. The recent combat experiences of local people's war along the southwestern border, and especially on the northern border against the Chinese aggressor forces, demonstrated that on the basis of developing broad forces, wherever attention is paid to building, and developing the effect of, the hard-core militia and self-defense forces, the combat strength of the locality is increased and the movement for all the people to fight and annihilate the enemy, defend the land, defend the people, and maintain their right to master the villages, factories, mines, towns, and cities is developed.

Because the Lam Son combat cluster in Hoa An District, Cao Bang Province promptly created hard-core militia and self-defense forces, the people and mass armed forces there transformed that area into a strong combat cluster which defeated enemy troops many times more numerous, stopped the enemy troops at the defense lines, annihilated hundreds of the enemy, captured prisoners, and captured enemy weapons and war facilities. On the other hand, there are localities, villages, and mining areas which have large populations and in which rather large numbers are armed, but which have not yet paid attention to building hard-core combat forces, so the locality's combat strength is limited, and in some places has not been created.

That is easily understood. War is a fierce, all-round test of strength between ourselves and the enemy. It demands that our soldiers and people both have a brave fighting spirit and scientifically organize combat forces which have good combat skills. Local people's war at the base level is a fight waged by many strata of people of different age groups, professional levels, capabilities, and conditions. The people's combat organization is broad and flexible. It is essential to organize hard-core forces to serve as the source of support and lead the way, and to create conditions for developing the broad masses' ability to fight and serve the fighting. More

specifically, when the enemy attacks it is necessary, above all, to have combat forces that are tightly organized, well trained and educated, have appropriate equipment, attack the enemy promptly, and prevent the enemy from entering the villages, factories, and cities. Only then can there be conditions for changing from a status of combat readiness and ordinary production to a combat status, and only then can there be a means for participating in combat and serving combat. If the hard-core combat forces are weak, fight the enemy in a sporadic, scattered manner, and allow the enemy to easily enter the locality, there will be no land or people to develop the local people's war movement at the base level.

So that the combat militia and self-defense units can truly become hard-core forces, in correct accordance with their position and mission, it is necessary to correctly and creatively resolve key problems regarding organization, equipment, training, operational planning, command, etc.

The organization of militia and self-defense units must, on the basis of arming and militarizing the entire population, be principally concerned with quality. But there must also be numbers and an organizational scale that are appropriate to the local missions and capabilities. We must select carefully in order to bring into such units people who truly have strong morale and fighting spirit, are prepared to sacrifice in fighting to defend their home areas, defend the people, the factories, and the mines, and defend the territory of the homeland--people who are capable and will stand firmly in the locality to fight the enemy. We must positively enlist former soldiers and cadres who in the past fought bravely and are now working and producing in the locality. We must bring such people into the hard-core combat platoons, companies, and battalions.

Especially, it is necessary to select the command cadres, especially the top command cadres and political officers, in order to assure that during combat they are exemplary and are determined to fight the enemy and defend the locality. Actual combat has demonstrated that if, under the most difficult, perilous combat conditions, the commander has a high degree of determination, and commands his combat unit calmly and firmly, the entire unit will fight even more resolutely and win smashing victories.

Recently, when organizing combat militia and self-defense units many places have paid attention to quality and have taken many steps to assure quality, such as by bringing party members and party committee members, including party chapter secretaries, into the mobile combat militia and combat self-defense units. Because their cadres stood firmly on the battlefield, attacked to annihilate the enemy and defend the villages and factories, and had a strong fighting spirit, the militia of village C.K. in Lang Son, a village militia company and a mine self-defense unit in Cao Bang, etc., became a heroic collective and a strong backbone for the movement for all the people to fight the enemy in the villages and enterprises, didn't give an inch, defeated the enemy troops, and defended the people, the villages, and the factories. At the same time, in some localities, although the combat circumstances were not complicated and our forces were still strong, because the commanders lacked fortitude, the hard-core combat units there could not

exploit their capabilities in the fighting to defend the locality. That proves that the selection of people to organize the hard-core combat units of the militia and self-defense forces, especially the selection of cadres to command those units, is extremely important.

Due to the requirement of stressing quality, the hard-core combat forces of the militia and self-defense forces can develop only to a certain numerical limit, and definitely cannot be developed in an unlimited manner. We must oppose both incorrect phenomena: developing the hard-core combat militia and self-defense forces as if they were ordinary forces, and not endeavoring to develop the combat militia and self-defense to the numerical limits allowed by actual capabilities.

The experiences of many basic units show that it is necessary to, on the basis of such factors as the combat missions, the level of combat organization and command, the operational plans, and the fighting methods, determine the organizational scale of the hard-core combat units of the militia and self-defense forces, so that it may be appropriate. The villages, towns, and factories may organize platoons and companies. The large, important villages, towns, and factories may organize many platoons or companies. The concentrated sites and state farms, may organize them on a larger scale. But the basic units of the hard-core combat force are still the platoons and companies. If truly strong hard-core combat militia and self-defense units are created, when it is necessary to develop them on a larger scale and engage in large-scale fighting we will have a solid basis. We must go all-out to avoid being simplistic and formalistic in determining the organizational scale of the combat militia and self-defense units. Only thereby can we avoid the situation of the organizational scale being large but the scale of fighting being small.

After the scale and composition of the hard-core militia and self-defense units have been determined, it is necessary to create and develop appropriate technical detachments. That is a new requirement and new capability of the militia and self-defense forces in war to defend the homeland. The recent combat experiences demonstrated that the reconnaissance, communications, military engineer, fire power detachments are combat components which are indispensable for assuring that the hard-core combat militia and self-defense units in the villages, factories, state farms, and combat clusters are capable of fighting independently and continually. To be appropriate, such detachments must be organized in accordance with the capabilities and conditions of each area. Some localities organized information units which operated with all facilities in order to assure uninterrupted command and communications. Some districts organized motor detachments to provide firepower, organized teams to lay and disarm mines, and organized many reconnaissance groups to grasp the enemy's situation.

The task of training and educating the hard-core combat units so that they become units with quality suitable to the requirements and missions must be carried out positively and by many methods, with high effectiveness. Even people who have already received basic education and training must continually study and improve themselves to raise their levels to meet the new combat requirements that are being posed.

The combat militia and self-defense units must be carefully trained to resourcefully use their most effective fighting methods, for only then can they annihilate many of the enemy and solidly defend the locality. Under the conditions of liberation war, our forces developed from a "have not" status to a "have" status and from a small-scale to a large-scale, so our people had to simultaneously fight the enemy and study fighting methods. Now, in the war to defend the homeland, we are able to train our forces before sending them into battle, and are able to give military training to the entire population. The localities must take full advantage of those capabilities to train the combat militia and self-defense units.

In the course of actual fighting by the combat militia and self-defense units the northern border, we began to realize the very demanding requirements regarding the education and training of the units fulfilling hard-core combat missions in the villages, combat clusters, state farms, and enterprises. The comrades who took the view that it was only necessary to train the militia and self-defense units in the basic techniques for using weapons and in some individual and squad tactics were totally wrong. Such viewpoints did not take into consideration the new requirements and capabilities of the militia and self-defense forces in war to defend the socialist homeland. The fight to defend the home areas, factories, villages, and sacred land of the homeland demands that the militia and self-defense forces, especially the hard-core combat militia and self-defense units, annihilate the enemy, defend each inch of ground, soldily defend the lives and property of the people and the economic bases, defeat the enemy from the very first battle and on the front line of defense, attack and counterattack to annihilate many of the aggressor troops in the very villages, factories, and home areas, remain steadfast in the localities, and firmly maintain mastery of the locality and of the battlefield in order to fight the enemy under all circumstances.

In order to fulfill those requirements, the hard-core combat militia and self-defense units must be well trained in order not only to fight and wear down the enemy troops but also to wipe out whole enemy units; not only to fight the enemy with the objectives, times, and locations selected by us but also to fight the enemy in accordance with the common intentions and plans; not only to fight on a small-scale but also to be capable of fighting medium and large battles on appropriate scales; not only know how to fight at the tactical level but also be capable of fighting at the campaign level; and not only fight well independently but also fight well in combined combat. The hard-core militia and self-defense units must be well trained in combat stratagems and tactics in many forms of combat: defensive fighting and offensive fighting; fighting behind enemy lines; on-the-spot fighting and mobile fighting outside their localities; fighting in coordination with the district and provincial troops and with the mobile main-line units, etc. It is necessary to concentrate the training of combat militia and self-defense units on the resourceful and creative application of operational plans to defend the locality under differing circumstances.

The combat militia and self-defense forces are large forces and their equipment and weapons are now much stronger than in the past. We must

train everyone to expertly use the various kinds of weapons and facilities at hand, including modern weapons. We must pay attention to training in the use of weapons that are appropriate to the tactics of the militia and self defense forces, and not mechanically provide training in the weapons used by main-force units. At the same time, it is necessary to avoid limiting training to training in the use of weapons and equipment used in "guerrilla," individual, and arbitrary fighting methods. Most of our combat militia and self-defense units at the base level have been organized on the scale of platoons, companies, and battalions. The equipment and weapons of the militia and self-defense forces are not limited to rifles, but include many other types of weapons, such as heavy machineguns, mortars, small artillery, anti-tank artillery, the various kinds of anti-aircraft guns, etc. The strength of the various kinds of weapons and equipment can develop high effectiveness only when they are used in coordination. Therefore, it is necessary to train the militia and self-defense units in the use of equipment and weapons in accordance with the formula of coordinated combat by the various forces and types of firepower at hand, in an appropriate manner.

Among the equipment and weapons of the hard-core combat militia and self-defense forces, the various kinds of primitive, self-made weapons still play an extremely important role. Combining the use of weapons capable of killing or wounding large numbers of enemy troops with the use of primitive weapons and taking advantage of the terrain is one of the basic contacts of combat training for the militia and self-defense units.

The actualities of the recent fighting along the northern border demonstrated only if the militia and self-defense forces take full advantage of the difficult terrain of the jungles and mountains can they exploit the effectiveness of the primitive, self-made weapons. Therefore, we must study the training of cadres and enlisted men who are "specialists" in the manufacture and use of primitive weapons. It is necessary to stipulate appropriate training curricula and methods, and it is especially important to give training in the actual use of such weapons, in a scientific manner and on a large scale. Today, we have many conditions for developing, and raising the level of, of the militia and self-defense members, so that they are skilled in fighting the enemy with both modern weapons and primitive weapons. That is a basis on which the hard-core combat units can apply many fighting methods with high effectiveness.

The operational plans of the hard-core combat militia and self-defense units differ in many ways from those of the district and provincial local tests. The operational plans of the mass armed forces units are not separated from production or from the locality. Before the enemy attacks, the members of such units are scattered all over, engaged in ordinary production or other work. Under such conditions, the operational plans must be extremely detailed and specific, and include alert orders and assembly points under differing conditions, the combat mission of each unit under those conditions, the designation of cadres to command each combat zone; the responsibilities of the command cadres regarding controlling forces and commanding units

under differing conditions, methods of liaison among units and between the upper echelon and the lower echelon, and methods of organizing places of temporary refuge for the people and for the families of militia and self-defense force members. In those operational plans, it is necessary to determine at an early date which areas must be held by all means in order to annihilate many of the enemy, defend the locality, and prevent the enemy from penetrating deeply; the key battles which are to be fought by the forces of many units; the attacks and counterattacks to annihilate entire enemy units; and the battles to be fought in coordination with the district and provincial troops.

Many militia and self-defense units have paid much attention to studying experiences in order to perfect the operational plans, to examining carefully the stipulations regarding combat readiness, and to the action plans. In those plans they have very specifically set forth the anti-aircraft alert commands when enemy infantry arrive; clearly determined who, after the alarm is sounded, will fight, who will hide property, who will serve the fighting, and who will defend the people who temporarily take refuge in places of safety; and set forth many ways of fighting the enemy, depending on whether the enemy launches small, medium, or large-scale attacks on the village. On the basis of the plans that were drafted, the hard-core militia combat forces carried out a division of labor: some units fought the enemy from afar and served as mobile reserves in the rear, while others defended the people seeking temporary refuge or patrol to locate and kill reconnaissance agents, spies, or those who disturb order and security. Even the plans to evacuate the people were also based on many different circumstances; at the same time, food and temporary shelters were made ready for people seeking temporary refuge. It is necessary to organize temporary refuge for the people so that when the alarm is sounded the members of combat militia and self-defense units will not have to worry about temporary refuge for their families, and can quickly go to the combat assembly areas.

Recently, many localities have organized practice maneuvers to defend the locality and practiced temporarily evacuating the people to places of safety. At present, all localities, factories, and enterprises have many tasks that must be performed, so they must overcome the difficulties and cleverly draft plans to arrange combat drills for the militia and self-defense units and drills in temporarily evacuating the people. It is possible to carry out drills regarding each part and each plan, in each hamlet, ward, and factory department. Of course, when they are carried out there must be strict leadership and guidance, and tight organization, to avoid wasting manpower and materiel and avoid confusing and upsetting the people.

The command organization of the militia and self-defense forces must be developed in a manner appropriate to the new situation. It must be clearly understood that the combat forces of the militia and self-defense units in the villages, towns, enterprises, and state farms are developing strongly. Those forces include not only infantry but also many technical detachments which are equipped with both modern and primitive weapons. In order to fully develop the strength of the combat militia and self-defense units, the

command cadres and military command organs at the village, district, and equivalent echelons must be capable of skillfully commanding the militia and self-defense units on the scale of a platoon, company, or battalion, and with many flexible operational forms and stratagems in a large area of operations which are highly effective.

The command cadres of those units must be skilled at commanding the units in small-scale fighting with the objectives, and at the same times and places they select. At the same time, they must have high effectiveness when fighting with the concentrated strength of the entire unit and in coordinated combat among the units in accordance with a common plan. Command must be well organized when the unit is on the defensive or when counter-attacking, attacking, ambushing, raiding, and attacking behind enemy lines. The units must be well commanded when coordinating with the provincial and district local troops and with the main-force troops in the tactical and campaign spheres. The units must be commanded correctly, flexibly, and nimbly when it fights individual battles as well as when it fights continually, on familiar terrain as well as in the area of operation of other villages, other factories, etc.

During the recent fighting along the northern border the combat self-defense units of the Tinh Tuc mine in Cao Bang Province had to fight in a rather large area of operations, and the mine's mobile unit had to deploy to stop the enemy at a location tens of kilometers from the mine area. The village combat militia in Lang Son had to fight in an area of operations of about 60 square kilometers and were made up of many combat elements, such as forces fighting at far-away defensive strong points, forces fighting to stop the enemy in key areas and around the villages, mobile forces, base defense forces, etc. A combat cluster in Cao Bang encompassed four villages in that area. The fighting there was continuous, lasted many days, and included many tactical forms: blocking actions, surprise attacks, ambushes, envelopments, etc.

In war to defend the homeland at present, in some cases the combat militia and self-defense forces are aided and supported by the navy, the air force, and long-range artillery. In the recent fighting to defend the northern border, the militia units in the mountain region were supplied by transport aircraft. Therefore, the cadres and organs commanding the militia and self-defense forces must also have the necessary knowledge about the modern combat arms and armed forces branches and know how to coordinate combat of the hard-core militia and self-defense forces with the mobile main-force units, the armed forces branches, and the combat arms operating in the locality.

At present, there is a rather large number of cadres commanding militia and self-defense units. That number includes both cadres who directly command the combat militia and self-defense platoons, companies, and battalions, and the cadres in the unified military command committees and the village military command committees. Most of those cadres are also responsible for many other missions, such as serving as village party committee secretary and political officer on the unified military committee. Many commanders of

self-defense platoons and companies are also party chapter secretaries or the part-time heads of production units. Therefore, we must resolutely organize training so that the managing cadres and the cadres directly commanding the units may have the skill and ability to command in accordance with the new requirements. The training must be carried out in many forms and with many methods: concentrated training, on-the-spot training, rotating short-term training, etc. If there are as yet no conditions for drafting complete training contents, it is necessary to draft the principal, essential materials first, without demanding perfection. It is possible to, on the basis of the recent combat experiences, begin to draft basic training contents, to help the base-level cadres grasp the matters essential to combat command, after which the training contents may be further developed.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

NEED TO TRANSFORM DISTRICTS INTO 'MILITARY FORTRESSES' DISCUSSED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 8, Aug 79 pp 9-24,45

[Article by Major General Dang Kinh: "Build the Districts Into Military Fortresses"]

[Text] Our people are now confronted by an extremely important historical mission: successfully building socialism and strongly defending the socialist Vietnamese homeland.

The actualities of the fight against the war of aggression along the southwestern border, and especially the recent resistance to aggressor Chinese forces on the northern border have confirmed the correctness and creativity of our Party and people in the resolution of basic problems regarding the building and consolidation of a national defense by all the people and the conduct of people's war to defend the homeland. One of those basic problems is to create a strategic deployment, a fortified defensive system composed of many echelons and strata in which each province is a strategic unit, each district is a fortress, and each village, hamlet, mine, factory, ward, construction site, and state farm is a combat position. The district military fortresses play a very important role in that defensive system.

In the recent fighting, although they were still in the building process many of our districts demonstrated the great capabilities of fortresses which fought resolutely, stopped the enemy's clamorous aggressive attacks, defended the localities, and served as solid base areas for the mobile main-force units, so that they could stop, counterattack, and launch annihilating attacks against, the enemy. Many districts, such as Trung Khanh, Muong Khuong, Hoa An, Phong Tho, Hong Ngu, Ben Cau, Duc Hue, etc., made positive contributions in the process of fierce fighting to counter the attacks of regiments and divisions of enemy troops.

However, it is still necessary to positively and urgently resolve many problems regarding knowledge, viewpoints, and actual organization, for only then can we build the districts into strong military fortresses on a national scale in order to contribute to strongly defending the homeland and smashing all new adventuristic, aggressive acts of the Beijing reactionaries.

This article deals with a number of problems and is intended to contribute to a better understanding of the Party's military line in the actualities of building the districts into military fortresses in war to defend the homeland.

The historic resolution of the Fourth Party Congress clearly determined that "We must build strong districts which truly become agricultural-industrial economic units, and make the district the area of operations for reorganizing production, specifically organizing and redistributing labor, and combining industry with agriculture, the national economy with the collective economy, and the industrial workers with the peasants. The district-level governmental administration must be built into an all-round state management and planning echelon with its own budget, and an echelon for managing production, circulation, and life in the district."

The directive of the Secretariat of the VCP Central Committee on the local military work in the new situation clearly indicated that "On the basis of the plans for economic construction and cultural development at the district level, there must be plans to build national defense by all the people, closely combine the economy with national defense, and build the district into a strong military fortress."

With full understanding of the Party's policies and the recent experiences, we can initially bring up the principal points regarding the role, missions, and requirements of the district military fortresses.

First of all, the district military fortress is the basic combat organization which uses the combined strength of local people's war to annihilate the enemy and strongly defend the localities. The district military fortress is the scene of the preparation and carrying out of the combat of tens of thousands, and sometimes hundreds of thousands, of people against the aggressor forces, with tens of thousands of people directly taking up arms to kill the enemy and serve the fighting. The district is a battlefield on which are active the militia and self-defense forces, the local troops (at times even the main-force troops of the provinces and municipalities), the armed public security forces, and at times even the mobile main-force units of the military regions or the Ministry. Thus in the district area of operations there may occur fighting by means of the combined strength of both the people and the troops, of both the broad combat forces and the hard-core combat forces, of both the on-the-spot forces and the mobile forces, and of both local forces and the main-force forces.

With its combined combat strength, the district military fortress has the mission of annihilating the enemy and the mission of strongly defending the locality, defending the land, defending the people, defending the governmental administration, smashing all disturbances by local reactionaries, and defending the economic, communications, and national defense bases in the district under all circumstances of war. Correctly resolving the relationship between annihilating the enemy and defending the locality and between the requirement to stand firm in the district and master the battlefield, and the requirement of attacking the enemy aggressor troops

and smashing the violent plots and acts of the reactionaries is a very important problem in the mission of the district military fortress. Only by correctly resolving that relationship in the district's over-all process of preparing, organizing, leading, commanding, and fighting can the district truly be made a military fortress of local people's war in people's war to defend the homeland.

The district military fortress is the basic combat organization of local people's war and coordinates directly and closely with warfare by the mobile main-force units in the process of war to defend the homeland. The district has extensive mass armed forces, has local troops in appropriate numbers and with high quality, has definite reserves of manpower and material, has a unified system of leadership, management, and command, etc. Those are conditions with which the district can mobilize all of its strength in coordinating closely and effectively with the mobile main-force units fighting in the district.

On the basis of the strength derived from mobilizing and organizing all people and troops to fight on the scale of the district, the district military fortress can coordinate closely with the mobile main-force units by means of its resolute and continued attacks and counterattacks against the enemy troops. The district is also capable of carrying out counterattacks, and defensive actions independently, in coordination with the operations of mobile main-force units elsewhere. The district's soldiers and people may concentrate forces to fight many battles on appropriate scales behind enemy lines, thus creating conditions for our mobile main-force units to annihilate the enemy troops at the front. The district's on-the-spot armed forces may coordinate their fighting within the formation of those units. The soldiers and people in the district have many capabilities for coordinating with the main-force units in the missions of reconnaissance, communication, guidance, supplying of food and ammunition, and transporting wounded. The district can resolve, to a certain degree, the problem of supplementing and developing the forces of the main-force units.

The actualities of the recent fighting have shown that the district is capable of fulfilling many missions involving the coordination of combat with many large detachments and mobile main-force units under complicated conditions, over a long period of time, and on the scale of both battles and campaigns.

The district military fortress is a relatively complete and self-sufficient rear-area unit of local people's war and war to defend the homeland. According to the Party's policy of developing the district echelon, at present each district (or precinct or town), with differing levels of development, has sufficient conditions for fulfilling the basic missions of a rear-area base in war, a solid political-morale base of support for the soldiers and people fighting at the front, and a source of supply of manpower and materiel for the front; for meeting such needs of the front as transportation, supplying ammunition, food, medicine, equipment, and facilities, evacuating and treating the wounded, repairing weapons; and for serving as a place for the building and development of new forces.

The district has all the components of a wartime rear-area base; a complete structure for the organization and leadership of the governmental administration, the masses, and the armed forces; an economic structure composed of agriculture (including forestry and fishing), handicrafts, industry, commerce, and organs for receiving, supplying, and distributing; material-technical bases for production, public health, education, and culture; a national defense structure made up of both existing and potential strength, both active and reserve forces, etc.

The experiences of the recent fighting show that if well organized the district can fulfill the function and mission of a basic, on-the-spot rear-area unit and contribute to the creation of a strong rear area for the entire nation.

The district military fortress is a unit which combines the economy with national defense and production with combat under all circumstances. It is an economic planning and management echelon with an appropriate economic structure and a budget which also carries out the militarization of the population, arms the population, etc. The district is capable of, and has basic conditions for, combining the economy with national defense and production with combat. Under unified and concentrated leadership and management, that combining of plans to develop the district in general and to develop the district militarily and with regard to the distribution of labor and the organization of combat forces, the organization of production bases and the formation of areas for combat, the distribution of technical materials, and the building of material-technical bases.

In the present situation, closely combining the economy with national defense and production with combat readiness in the sphere of the district is a strategic measure for promoting the great undertaking of socialist construction, improving the people's living standards, normalizing all activities of our soldiers and people, creating great national defense strength, and assuring a high degree of combat readiness. That measure contributes directly to smashing the nefarious plots of the Beijing reactionaries, who want to weaken and annex our country.

In war, the soldiers and people in the district still resolutely achieve a close combination of combat and production in order to directly increase material wealth to meet part of the needs of the fighting by on-the-spot capabilities, while also creating some of the material preconditions for winning victory when the war is prolonged. That is one of the manifestations of their capability to master the locality and the battlefield to annihilate the enemy with increasingly greater strength under all circumstances.

The above role, position, missions, and requirements of the district military fortress are certain to be fully developed and victoriously attained on the basis of the new, extremely great capabilities of the district echelon in the process of socialist transformation and socialist construction. In complete contrast to the resistance war against the French colonialists

and the resistance war against the U.S. for national salvation, today the districts, carrying out the Party's policy of building up the district echelon, are gradually becoming complete and self-sufficient large-scale socialist economic units, units which combine the economy with national defense. In the districts, the basic elements of the superior socialist system necessary to create the greatest strength ever for people's war--such as socialist production relationships, the system of socialist collective mastership by the working people, large-scale socialist production, and the material-technical bases of socialism, the new culture, and the new socialist man--are being created and developed. All of those things create a new capability in the mobilization, organization, and use of the all-round strength of the district to the highest degree and as rapidly as possible, in order to meet the requirements of defending the locality and the homeland.

According to the new plan, the districts have appropriate populations and areas. With its existing population, the district is capable of organizing large combat and combat-service forces, and has rather plentiful manpower reserves with which to meet the needs of combat and to develop on-the-spot forces and labor forces to produce even during combat. Recently many districts in the rear areas have been capable of organizing complete units to send to the front to fight, and of mobilizing tens of thousands of work-days to serve the fighting.

Although the material-technical bases of the districts are not great, and in some cases are still weak, conditions and capabilities have been created for doing an increasingly better job of meeting the combat and production requirements in the districts. Every district has, to varying degrees, increasingly developed capabilities regarding communications, medical care, the first-aid treatment of the wounded, transportation and supply, weapons repair, ordinary vehicles, foodstuffs, and other facilities and material. Recently, some mountain-region districts were able to supply food for thousands of people who fought daily over a rather long period of time. One district was able to mobilize thousands of pack-horse trips to serve the fighting. The problem lies in knowing how to appropriately develop and fully and concentratedly utilize resources.

Our social and production organization in the districts has developed in such a way as to become increasingly complete and self-sufficient. At present the basic unit is the village, with production organized on the scale of the village and specialized. Some places have been organized into production clusters. Production management is also being changed and perfected. Military organization at the basic unit level, closely tied in with that new development of production, has undergone change and development. Recently, as the villages have been formed into production clusters military organization at the basic level has become increasingly stronger. That has created great organizational strength. It has allowed us to mobilize and organize in order to fully develop the capabilities, experiences, traditions, and strengths of the ethnic groups in combat and production; fully develop the strength of each sector, organ, and man association; achieve unified, harmonious, and close operations among the forces, components, and echelons;

and correctly and rationally utilize the districts material wealth and material-technical bases. All of those things will create a great combined strength with which to fulfill the combat and production missions in the district with a high degree of effectiveness.

The district's system of leadership, management, and command is continually being improved and perfected with regard to organization, with clear functions, missions, and powers is one of the decisive elements in fully developing the capabilities of the entire population in the process of building up the district. The actualities of the recent fighting confirmed that system's combat leadership, organization, and command in a number of districts. That proves that the organizational system of the Party, the governmental system, and the military command system in the district are advancing to the fulfillment of missions in the great undertaking of socialist construction, as well as in the mission of leading and commanding the fight of the entire population and army against the aggressor troops in the districts. That is a solid assurance that the district can be transformed into a strong military fortress under all wartime conditions.

Those new capabilities will be even greater when we are able to develop the individual strength of each district; when the district military fortresses in a province and in neighboring areas coordinate and unite with, and assist, one another in construction and combat; when the rear area districts do a good job of supporting the districts at the front; and when the province and municipalities do a good job of specific guidance and implementation guidance on the spot.

The policy of building district military fortresses is a new, very creative development in our Party's military line and line of national defense by all the people and people's war to defend the homeland in the new phase, and in Vietnamese military science and art in the enterprise of defending the socialist Vietnamese homeland. The district military fortress is the inevitable product of national defense by all the people and is built on the basis of the accomplishments in socialist transformation and construction throughout the nation.

Therefore we must, on the basis of building the district into an agricultural (or forestry or fishing) and industrial economic unit, build the district into a military fortress, and closely combine military development with all-round development in the district. That viewpoint reflects the inevitable and unique progress of the great enterprise of building and defending socialism in our country and the law of the formation and development of national defense by all the people, of the strength of people's war to defend the homeland on the basis of the strength of all the people and the greatest all-round strength ever of our superior socialist system. It also reflects the unified, organic relationship between the great task of socialist construction and the enterprise of defending our socialist homeland in the new revolutionary phase, and is appropriate to the situation of our people having to cope continually and over a long period of time with the plots of the Beijing reactionists, who want to weaken and annex our country.

With full understanding of those viewpoints, the process of building district military fortresses must be closely bound to the process of constructing socialism in the sphere of the district. It is necessary to rely on the accomplishments of the three revolutions--the revolution in production relationship, the scientific-technical revolution, and the ideological-cultural revolution--of which the scientific-technical revolution is the key concern, and to carry out that process simultaneously with the process of building the district in all regards and to contribute to furthering that process.

In building district military fortresses, it is always necessary to fully understand the Party's viewpoint of all-round war by all the people to defend the socialist homeland. Under the condition of socialism being built and developed throughout our nation, the Party's viewpoint of waging all-round war by all the people has new contents. One of the new, very basic contents is that the people's war to defend the homeland is being waged on the basis of greater-than-ever strength of the superior socialist system which is continually developing throughout our country. Therefore, the building of district military fortresses must be solidly based on, and fully develop, that new strength.

In the sphere of the district, although there are still differences regarding all-round capabilities and potential, and with regard to the level of development, each district has established socialist production relationships, has confirmed the collective mastership right of the laboring people, has an economic structure that is increasingly rational and complete, has certain material-technical bases, has an increasingly perfected leadership and management system, has definite potential regarding manpower and material, has conditions for combining the economy with national defense, etc. With those new elements, each district can mobilize and organize the entire population to fight the enemy with an entity that is united, tight, scientific, and vast, on the scale of an entire district, by means of the greatest strength ever of the entire district, and can enable people's war in the scope of the district to develop to a high degree from the very beginning of the war to defend the homeland.

In building district military fortresses it is necessary to firmly grasp the strategic goals of war to defend the homeland: annihilating the enemy, defending the economic bases, and firmly grasping the slogans of mastering the nation, mastering the battlefield to annihilate the enemy, and annihilating the enemy to master the nation and the battlefield.

The district military fortresses must be built on the basis of the all-round and great strength of the system of socialist collective mastership by the working people, of whom the hard core is the worker-peasant alliance under the leadership of the working class in the sphere of the district. With that strength, it is necessary to arm and militarize the entire population, build armed forces with appropriate numbers and high quality, create a strong battlefield status of mastery and offensive which is complete and effective, employ many highly effective measures and stratagems, closely

combine combat with production and the economy with national defense, etc. All of those things are intended to assure that the soldiers and people of the district exercise their right to master the nation, master the locality, and master the battlefield, and stand firmly in their district, resolutely fight to annihilate many aggressor troops, and strongly defend the governmental administration, the land, the material, and the economic bases under all wartime conditions.

The victory of the fight against the Chinese aggressor troops in the northern border region demonstrated that many districts fought enemy regiments and divisions over a period of many days and annihilated tens of thousands of the enemy. The soldiers and people of those districts stood firmly and fought resolutely to defend the land, the people's lives, and the economic bases, to organize and develop forces, and to stabilize the people's living conditions in a manner appropriate to wartime conditions.

In building the districts into military fortresses it is necessary to fully understand the offensive strategic concept of people's war to defend the homeland. The district military fortresses absolutely are not places where the soldiers and people in the district only defend against and stop the enemy. "Fortress" does not mean taking the defensive, passively awaiting for the enemy to arrive in order to fight them. The district military fortress is, above all, a place where the soldiers and people in the district take the initiative, positively make preparations in all regards, resolutely and positively counterattack and attack to annihilate the aggressor troops as soon as they reach the villages and factories of the district, prevent them from penetrating deeply into the district, and smash the enemy's attacks at the very door of the district. However, in order to attack and counterattack in order to annihilate large numbers of enemy troops, it is necessary to take defensive actions. But counterattacks and attacks must be the principal, permanent, and universal actions of the soldiers and people in the district.

The offensive strategic thought must be fully understood when drafting the district's combat operations plans, building and organizing combat forces and using those forces in the process of combat, when creating a battlefield position, and when organizing the district's rear area bases. The important matter is to resolutely focus the strength of the entire district on the district's front-line, and smash the attacks of the aggressor troops on that line in order to brilliantly implement the offensive strategic thought and victoriously implement the Party's strategy in war to defend the homeland.

The district military fortresses lay within the national defensive system. They must be built in accordance with the strategic deployment of that defensive system. Each district must, according to its position in the province, in the military region, and in the strategic deployment of the entire nation, and depending on whether it is a district to the front or to the rear, and whether it borders a front-line district or is deep within the rear-area of the province or the nation, correctly determine the contents of building the district into a military fortress. Each district on the

front-line must resolutely and promptly fight the enemy and strongly defend every inch of the homeland's front-line. Each district to the rear must be prepared to send manpower and materiel to the districts toward the front, on the front-line, along the border or seacoast, etc., while also being prepared to annihilate the enemy on the spot to defend the locality. When war breaks out they must rapidly send many forces to the front, while retaining sufficient forces to annihilate the enemy and defend the locality should they set foot on the district. That is a very basic requirement of the rear-area districts.

In order to firmly grasp the base problems mentioned above, we must study the principal contents of the military development of districts:

1. Build districts that are solid politically and achieve military-civilian solidarity.

The experiences of the recent fighting prove that this is one of the important, decisive contents with regard to the development of the district's combat strength.

As we know, the Beijing reactionaries are a very insidious, cruel, and extremely wiley enemy. The Chinese great-nation expansionists and big-nation hegemonists, carrying out a plot to invade our country, have employed the most odious and cowardly schemes and acts. They have both used acts of aggression against our nation from beyond our borders and incited bad elements to rebel and attack us from within. They have both barbarously shot and killed our people and bribed and seduced, and have both cruelly destroyed and plundered and waged psychological warfare in hopes of creating division, confusion, and suspicion among our people and armed forces. Therefore, our people's fight against the Chinese aggressors is a very fierce and extremely complicated one.

In order to win victory in fighting such an enemy, strongly defend the Vietnamese homeland, defend the great undertaking of building socialism, and defend our beloved countryside, all citizens and soldiers in the district must form an unshakable solidarity bloc under the centralized, unified leadership and management of the party organizations and governmental administrations at the various levels. The nucleus of that solidarity bloc is made up of solid, strong party chapters, village party committees, and district party committees, which play a vanguard role in building up the hamlets, villages, and districts in the fight to defend the homeland and the countryside. The actualities of the fighting have confirmed that if the party committees and the people's committees remain steadfast in the locality and fight resolutely, the party members, cadres, people, and soldiers will fight even more selflessly. And therefore, the leadership directives and combat orders will be carried out with a high degree of effectiveness. The leadership, guidance, and command strength of the party committees and the people's committees at the various echelons right on the battlefield is the glue which binds together the entire Party, the entire population, and the entire army into a single bloc, and strongly encourages

the soldiers and people of the district to offer their lives and property in order to win victory for the home area and the nation.

The strength of the solidarity bloc of the entire population is steadily developed when the entire Party, the entire population, and the entire army firmly grasp our Party's line of waging war to defend the homeland. That is a process of educating the people so that they may clearly understand the enemy's plots, the Party's strategic intention, and our strategy for waging the war, and operational guidance thought in war to defend the homeland. We must carry out continuous education to enable the entire population and the entire army to have confidence in the victory of our people, have confidence in the leadership of the Party and the strength of the district, and devote their all to victoriously implementing the Party's war-waging line in their district, transform will and determination into organizational strength and into concrete results in the tasks of recruiting troops, building armed forces, preparing the battlefield, building material-technical bases, etc. We must enable each citizen, each soldier, each cadre, and each party member to have correct, basic awareness of their responsibilities and mastership rights in the great undertaking of building and defending the socialist homeland and to continually strengthen their spirit of revolutionary vigilance and spirit of sacrificing oneself for the independence and freedom of the homeland and the victory of socialism.

2. Carry out the arming and militarization of the entire population.

This is a concentrated manifestation of our Party's viewpoint regarding the waging of people's war to defend the homeland. Today, that viewpoint has been formalized and legalized by means of a Decree of the Council of Ministers.

The district can become an inviolable military fortress only when the level of armament of the entire population and the militarization of the entire population in the sphere of the district has reached the high level of the movement for the entire nation to fight the enemy and for all citizens to be soldiers. That is also a content intended to realize the working people's right and obligation of socialist collective mastership in the enterprise of defending the homeland.

The basic goal of arming the entire population and militarizing the entire population is to develop to the combat strength of the district to the highest degree and assure that the people and armed forces in the district take the initiative in the fight against the Chinese aggressor forces, rapidly transform the entire district from a status of combat readiness to a combat status, and clearly combine combat with production.

The content of arming and militarizing the entire population in the sphere of the district is very rich, and implementing that content is a process of very painstaking mobilization and organization, in order to be appropriate to the capabilities and specific conditions of each district and meet the requirements of both the immediate fighting and the long-range enterprise of defending the homeland.

It is necessary to carry out basic and universal education for all citizens in the age category with the right and obligation of defending the homeland regarding the position and mission of their district with regard to the enterprise of defending the homeland in the province, the military region, and the nation as a whole. On that basis, we must clearly determine the combat missions of each village, factory, state farm, construction site, and organ.

General military training for the whole population consists of weapons firing, the use of primitive weapons, ammunition supplying, guarding, patrolling, maintaining order and security, building fortifications and bunkers, guarding against poison gas and poisonous substances, etc., in order to assure that each citizen knows how to fight the enemy and fights them with great resourcefulness.

The combat and combat-service forces and the production forces must be organized scientifically and rationally in each village, factory, construction site, state farm, and organ; they must be provided equipment, weapons, and facilities; they must undergo training and actual practice in accordance with the plans of the organs, production bases, and villages; it must be clearly determined which people will remain behind to fight; and it must be determined which facilities, such as trucks, tractors, medicine and food stocks, etc., will be used in combat by each production base and organ.

We must have a way of life, work, and production that is urgent, tight, disciplined, and appropriate to the requirement of combat readiness in the organs and production bases, and closely combine all production activities, daily life, and combat preparedness in the districts over-all activities, especially by the party committees and people's committees at the various levels, in order to assure that the entire district rapidly enters the fighting with tight organization and takes the initiative in fighting the enemy with the greatest strength that has been prepared.

The decisive factor in victoriously carrying out the arming and militarization is the leadership and centralized, unified implementation organization of the District Party Committee and District People's Committee. In leadership as well as in specific implementation organization, it is necessary to concentrate on each task and each area of operations. The districts unified military command committee must fulfill its responsibility of organizing the implementation of the resolutions and directives of the District Party Committee and People's Committee. If it only disseminates plans and launches movements there can be no arming and militarization of the population with high quality.

Arming and militarizing the entire population is in essence a deep and broad political campaign, a process of closely combining the educational and organizational measures, combining persuasion with legal measures. It cannot be carried out with simplistic, half-hearted measures, and all the more cannot be carried out by coercive, crude measures.

3. Build and develop armed forces which are appropriate to the combat missions of the district military fortress.

It is necessary to base the building and development of the district's armed forces on the position, role, and mission of the district military fortress, on the new developments of the war to defend the homeland, and on the specific conditions of each district, in order to correctly resolve the problems regarding quantity, organizational scale, equipment, training, fighting methods, etc.

The basic combat forces of the district are the broad mass armed forces in the hamlets, villages, factories, state farms, and organs. Therefore, the key concern of the task of building and developing the districts' armed forces is building, developing, and consolidating the militia and self-defense units. The building and development of those forces must be in correct accordance with the decrees of the Council of Ministers that have been promulgated.

The building and development of the mass armed forces must be based on the building and consolidation of the Party organizations, the governmental administrations, and the mass associations, and on the promotion of production and the assurance of the living conditions of the people in the hamlets, villages, enterprises, state farms, and construction sites. The places which already have strong political, economic, and social bases must continue to be consolidated, in order to create a basis for building and developing militia and self-defense forces into very strong combat forces. The places in which the above aspects must be perfected and consolidated must combine the fulfillment of the missions of consolidating and perfecting the Party organizations, governmental administrations, and mass associations with promoting production, improving the living conditions of the people, and build and develop militia and self-defense forces.

The armed forces in the districts must fight the enemy with the combined strength of the entire district and with all fighting methods and strategies that are appropriate to local people's war. Those forces must be built in order to be capable of fighting in the defensive system of the district's hamlets, villages, factories, state farms, and construction sites in order to stop the enemy, both moving to fight the enemy all over the district and being capable of annihilating the enemy in small-scale battles by teams, squads, and platoons; both fighting the enemy according to the objectives, opportunities, and locals that arise and fighting skillfully in accordance with a common plan and in a common formation; both fighting battles to annihilate the enemy troops in relatively large battles on the scale of a company, a battalion, or even larger unit; and both fighting independently in the villages and coordinating closely with the militia forces of the other villages in combat clusters or from villages to the rear, with local troops, and perhaps even with the mobile main-force units stationed in the locality, etc.

We must, on the basis of the above missions and requirements, correctly resolve the problems regarding numbers, organizational scale, equipment, fighting method, and training in the process of building militia and self-defense forces. In that process, it is necessary to consider the new capabilities regarding the manpower, equipment, and material bases of each village and of the entire district in order to develop that new strength in organizing militia and self-defense forces. With the present capabilities and conditions, we can and must increase the organizational scale of the militia and self-defense forces and develop the teams and units of the specialized branches. No matter what the specific situation, improving quality is the central concern of the process of building militia and self-defense forces. That is a measure for assuring that the militia and self-defense forces both annihilate many of the enemy and strongly defend the villages, factories, state farms, and construction sites under all circumstances, and smash the enemy's aggressor attacks in their localities.

With regard to building militia and self-defense forces, it is necessary to build sufficiently strong regular district forces to serve as the hard-core combat forces of people's war in the district.

Today, each of our districts is capable of building strong local regular units. The districts at the front, in the key areas, can build many companies or battalions of local regular troops with the necessary combat arms which are capable of fulfilling the hard-core missions in mastering the locality, mastering the battlefield, aiding and coordinating with the militia and self-defense forces, annihilating the enemy, and strongly defending the district under all circumstances.

The local regular troops fall within the organizational system of the regular army, and are organized, equipped, trained, and supplied in accordance with the common principles of the regular army. But the regular army has the mission of operating in a definite area of operations and build and fight in accordance with the intention of fighting the enemy and defending the district, so the local regular units must have numbers, organizational scales, equipment, fighting methods, and rear services-technical bases that are appropriate to the conditions of each district. They must not automatically be modelled after the mobile main-force units, and local regular units must not be created in accordance with a common model for all the districts.

In order to fulfill their mission in the district military fortress, the local regular troops must become the district's "strong fist," which attacks and annihilates the enemy troops in the district, above all in the important areas, and stands firmly there in order to coordinate closely with the combat activities of the militia and self-defense forces and effectively aid those forces in the villages, hamlets, and combat clusters. The district local forces may both fight in a dispersed manner on a small scale and fight in a concentrated manner with all their forces, and both fight independently and fight in coordination with the troops of the province, the military region, and the mobile main-force units.

The above requirements are the direction for studying the correct resolution of the problems regarding the numbers, organizational scale, and fighting methods of the local regular troops in a manner appropriate to each district. In order to meet those requirements, it is necessary to further improve the combat quality of the district regular troops and further perfect them with regard to organization and equipment. We must strengthen the technical detachments and further strengthen the firepower facilities, the command facilities, the transportation facilities, and the support facilities of the district regular troops.

The actualities of the recent fighting demonstrated that in combat as well as in construction, only if local regular troops in the district closely coordinate all of their activities with those of the militia and self-defense forces of the villages, state farms, and factories can there be created a great combat strength.

4. Build solid and strong combat hamlets and villages, combat state farms, forestry sites, and towns, and combat clusters.

The district can truly become a military fortress when all the combat hamlets, villages, construction sites, state farms, and state forests are made solid and strong for the combat hamlets and villages are still the basic units of local people's war. The district's people's war battlefield position is a broad system of combat hamlets and villages that are strong and integrated, and coordinate closely with one another in accordance with the unified operational intentions and plans of the district.

Building combat hamlets and villages is always a process of building the hamlets in all respects--political, economy, and military. Building hamlets and villages that are strong politically and economically is the basis for building strong combat hamlets and villages. But building hamlets and villages militarily is a basic content for enabling the hamlets and villages to become combat hamlets and villages.

The building of combat hamlets and villages and combat factories and state farms with regard to the military aspect includes all-round contents: the organization of combat leadership and command; the militarization of the entire population; strong mass armed forces; combat weapons and equipment and assuring food to feed the hard-core armed forces; a system of fortifications and combat trenches and bunkers; a system of bunkers and trenches for evasion and for concealing material and foodstuffs; a system of obstacles; combat readiness and combat plans, etc.

As basic units of the district military fortresses, the combat hamlets and villages must fully manifest the new strength of the working people, who are now the masters of their country and their lives. They must be places where the Party organizations, governmental administrations, armed forces, and people fully manifest their authority, remain steadfast, and fight to annihilate the enemy under all circumstances.

Each combat hamlet and village must be a strongpoint sufficiently strong to annihilate many of the enemy, defend the hamlets, villages, state forests, and state farms, and can fight for a long time, persistently defeat many attacks of many enemy units, fight victoriously even after the enemy has passed through, and form combat strongpoints in the enemy's rear.

The basic fighting methods of the combat hamlets and villages are on-the-spot fighting methods in each hamlet, combined with the mobile fighting methods among the hamlets in the sphere of the villages. Therefore, it is necessary to pay all-out attention to building and developing both forces to fight the enemy on the spot and strong mobile forces of the villages, factories, and construction sites. We must pay attention to building a system of combat fortifications, both open and secret, fortifications and bunkers for taking shelter, anti-aircraft fortifications, communications trenches, etc.

Our combat hamlets and villages of today must also be integrated with one another to form combat clusters. Clusters of combat hamlets and villages are a combat organization form of local people's war which allow close coordination among the on-the-spot combat forces in order to fight the enemy with high effectiveness. In each combat cluster there must be such basic elements as unified leadership and command, unified operational plans, strong mobile combat forces, rear services-material bases to support the fighting, and a strong combat village to serve as the combat nucleus for the entire cluster. The scale of each combat cluster is not fixed. Depending on the specific conditions, the combat clusters may be made up of two or three villages. Sometimes one village, state farm, or factory forms a combat cluster.

According to our plan for building districts, the agricultural cooperatives will be organized into production clusters. The populated zones will be reformed into rather large population areas. Then, the organization of combat clusters will be even more essential.

The building of combat factories, state forests, and state farms differs from the building of combat hamlets and villages. In the latter case, highly concentrated production is organized, the production management system is tight, the workers are industrial, agricultural, or collective agricultural workers, and the material-technical bases are more modern. That permits the organization of the factories, state forests, and state farms into strong combat units. The problem that is posed is to organize combat forces in an appropriate manner, organize resolute and resourceful combat leadership and command, and have scientific and correct plans, in order to rapidly transform even the factories, state forests, and state farms into strong, solid, combat clusters which resolutely hold their ground in order to annihilate the enemy and defend the production bases. The combat self-defense forces of the factories, state forests, and state farms must be built into on-the-spot combat forces which are also mobile combat forces in the sphere of the entire district.

When building combat hamlets and villages and combat clusters in accordance with the district's over-all plan, it is necessary to prepare in advance a tactical area of operations for the regular district troops, the main-force provincial troops, and also for the mobile main-force units. That preparation includes a system of fortifications, roads, and bases to assure rear services.

The district must also build base areas for the entire district, including both basic and reserve base areas. The base areas include such elements as the organization of over-all leadership and command; material-technical bases for all aspects, including material reserves; defensive combat forces; bases for storage, medical treatment, supply, distribution, and recovery; a basing area for forces being created, etc. Each local district base is built and consolidated so that it is truly solid.

The highest requirement of the building of a system of combat villages and clusters is the formation of a complete and effective battlefield position for the entire district, in order to annihilate many of the enemy troops and strongly defend the district under all circumstances. In that battlefield position, the combat villages and clusters aid and closely coordinate with one another, the rear-area forces move to the front to help fight the enemy; they both stop the enemy and launch continuous counterattacks and attacks to annihilate enemy units and large numbers of enemy troops; and they both fight independently and coordinate with the upper-echelon forces. That is a battlefield position in which the soldiers and people of the entire district stick together and rely on each other long and firmly to attack the enemy in any situation with the strength of the entire district.

5. Build a strong system of rear services and technical support for the district military fortress.

Only if the people and the armed forces have the necessary rear services-technical support can they fight the enemy. The requirement of rear services and technical support for the district military fortress is to resolve such problems comprehensively and solidly, to respond to the increasingly greater development of people's war from the very beginning in the district's area of operations.

The actualities of the recent fighting demonstrated that it is necessary to build and deploy rear services-technical support bases in the villages, factories, state farms, and combat clusters. In some places it is necessary to deploy them right in the villages in order to enable the militia and self-defense forces to fight continually. There, the rear services and technical support bases must principally provide support with regard to food, treatment of wounded and ill soldiers, and reserves of ammunition and weapons, organized by the villages, factories, and state farms themselves.

Another system of rear services-technical support must be deployed in accordance with the districts operational plan in order to support the local district troops and the district's mobile combat troops (from the rear-area village or the state farms and construction sites). That system

is deployed among the combat clusters or in predetermined operational positions for which the district is responsible.

The district's basic system of rear services-technical support is organized in its rear base area. This is a system which provides relatively complete support with relatively great reserve stocks which is intended to meet the requirements of continuous, medium-scale and large-scale, and coordinated combat by the forces all over the district.

All three of those systems are combined into a complete rear services-technical system and is deployed in a manner appropriate to the district's over-all operational plan. That system can fulfill such key missions as supplying and transporting food, ammunition, medicine, weapons, and military equipment for the combat units; transporting, evacuating, and treating wounded and ill soldiers during combat; carrying out ordinary repairs on weapons and vehicles, and producing some ordinary infantry weapons; and assuring the supplying and equipping of recently organized militia and self-defense units. That system must have a complete structure that encompasses the various aspects of support--combat support, production support, support for the creation and development of forces--and balances the stocks that are consumed and depleted with the reserve stocks, etc.

The formula for creating strong rear services-technical support bases is to strongly develop the economy in order to, on that basis, fully develop the capabilities of each village, factory, construction site, state farm, and organ; mutual aid and assistance among the villages, factories, state farms, and organs; the rear area supporting the front; the provinces and municipalities helping the districts, etc. Closely combining combat with production in wartime is a basic formula for creating increasingly strong rear services-technical bases for the district.

6. Perfect the district's unified leadership-command apparatus.

Building strong district military fortresses and defending the locality is the responsibility of the entire Party and of all people and soldiers in the district, under the leadership of the district Party organization. If there are a strong fighting will, strong forces, a good battlefield position, and good support, but there is a lack of close coordination among the forces under unified, centralized leadership and command, it will be impossible to create the greatest combined combat strength. The Party organization at each echelon, from the villages to the districts, must bear responsibility in all regards for the people in their localities. The Party's leadership must be manifested in all regards--politically, ideologically, and organizationally--by means of directives and resolutions and by means of the exemplary actions of all Party members. The important matter is that leadership must be formalized in terms of plans by means of increasing the responsibility of the echelons and sectors with regard to the organization of implementation. All tasks, organizations, and operational forces of the district intended to build it into a military fortress must be placed under the centralized, unified leadership of the district Party committee.

It is necessary to clearly determine the responsibility, and strengthen the leadership of the local party committees with regard to the mission of building the district into a military fortress and rapidly get the leadership of the party committee over the local military task onto the right track.

The unified military command committees of the districts must be improved so that they have sufficient forces, good ability, and strong revolutionary ardor. It must do a good job of being the staff of the party committee and the commander of the armed forces in the district, in order to victoriously fulfill all missions. In order to assure the coordination of the forces in the district, the district's unified military command committee must not only be skilled in guiding the local military task but also be skilled in the task of organizing combat command. Due to the requirements of the combat mission and the development of the forces of the district military fortress, the command cadres and organs must fulfill the following requirements:

A resolute, unwavering fighting spirit and will which is representative of determination to fight the enemy and defend the locality.

Ability to organize and guide the development and combat movements of the district.

Ability to directly command the fighting in each combat clusters and each concentrated unit at the battalion and regiment levels in combined arms combat and in many tactical forms.

Political and economic ability and knowledge in order to develop combined strength in combat.

In comparison to the requirements of the missions of the district echelon in the new situation, the local military organ in the district must be urgently perfected organizationally and its abilities must be improved in all ways, especially the management and command of troops and staff work. That matter is relevant to many echelons and sectors of the upper-echelon organs, but each cadre in the local military organ must endeavor to train, continually study, and advance to meeting the new requirements of the new mission.

It is necessary to consolidate the centralized command, from the basic units in the villages, enterprises, organs, construction sites, state farms, and state forests to the regular district units and the district military organ. We must heighten consciousness of discipline, consciousness of organization and discipline, consciousness of carrying out orders, and consciousness of requesting directives and reports at all echelons. It is necessary to organize a system of truly uninterrupted communications and liaison, by means of all forces and facilities at hand, in order to effectively serve leadership and command from the district level to the combat clusters and villages, and both in the rear and at the front. We must assure good

good communications with the upper echelon in order to report on the situation and request prompt instructions. That problem is even more important with regard to the districts on the border, on sea islands, and in the key areas.

Building the district into a strong military fortress is a long, continuous process. It cannot be done in a moment or only once. At present, in leading and guiding the task of building the district into a military fortress it is necessary to base it on the immediate combat readiness requirements and missions, in order to carry it out urgently, positively, and with real effort. At the same time, it is necessary to, on the basis of the state's plans for developing the districts during the next few years and over the long run, steadily increase the strength of the district military fortress in all respects. We must clearly realize the all-round requirements of a district military fortress in the enterprise of defending the homeland and building the nation in order to fulfill the important, heavy missions as soon as possible and have more time to improve and complete the military fortresses of people's war to defend the homeland.

5616

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

DAC LAC VILLAGE SAID TO MOP UP 'ARMED REACTIONARIES'

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 8, Aug 79 pp 46-53

[Article by Tran Le: "Activate the Masses to Mop Up the Armed Reactionaries, Build Revolutionary Administrations"]

[Text] Like the other localities in the south, since it was completely liberated Dac Lac has positively and urgently performed one of the major tasks in the newly liberated area: building and consolidating revolutionary administrations and maintaining political security and social order.

Dac Lac, a locality in the ethnic minority area, an area in which the U.S. and their puppets carried out many wily plots and schemes to divide and sabotage the Vietnamese community of ethnic minority peoples, has a difficult and complicated mission in mopping up the reactionaries and completely eliminating the vestiges of U.S. neocolonialism in our country's ethnic minority area.

Only by fulfilling that task well can there be a basis and conditions for consolidating the revolutionary administrations and fulfilling the mission of socialist transformation and socialist construction in the locality.

Dac Lac has achieved many results and learned many initial lessons in motivating the masses to mop up the reactionaries and build and consolidate the revolutionary administrations, the mass associations, and the local armed forces.

This article represents experiences in motivating the masses to mop up the armed reactionaries and build revolutionary administrations, based on the actual experience of village X in Dac Lac.

1. Fully understand the lines and policies of the Party and correctly evaluate the mass situation.

For decades the French and U.S. imperialists took advantage of the ethnic, religious, and cultural differences, and the uneven levels of economic development, among the ethnic groups in our country to divide the ethnic

groups, in hopes of transforming some people into instruments for carrying out their long-range aggressive plots against our country. In nearly all localities in the Tay Nguyen area, they organized and cultivated many reactionary political, military, religious, and cultural organizations.

That may be seen very clearly from the actual situation of village X in Dac Lac.

Before the liberation, the enemy organized four Popular Force platoons in village X, and there were 13 to 15 civil guards in each hamlet. The village's population of more than 3,000 people belonged to many religions: Catholic, Protestant, Cao Dai, etc. The reactionary political organizations, which took many different forms and encompassed many ethnic groups, religions, clans, villages, etc., had a long history.

The enemy's coercion and deception had considerable consequences. They created many loyal lackeys in the locality, and hundreds of youths in the village were forced to serve in the puppet army. Village X became a "base" of the counterrevolutionaries during the war.

After the south was completely liberated the reactionaries in village X continued to obstinately sabotage the revolution and control and dominate the masses. Many of them sneaked into our governmental organizations, mass associations, and armed forces at the base level.

In that situation, incorrect concepts arose regarding the policy of motivating the masses, mopping up the reactionaries, and rebuilding the administrations, armed forces, and mass associations in village X. Some people suggested that in places controlled by the enemy we would have a difficult time motivating the masses. Some people believed that since the people had been "made reactionary," it would be difficult to educate them so that they could become good people! And for that reason some cadres and men feared hardship, difficulty, and danger, and were intemperate in their actions, to the point of violating the ethnic group policies of the Party and state.

In order to overcome those incorrect concepts, the Dac Lac Provincial Party Committee confirmed that in order to activate the masses, mop up the reactionaries, build the revolutionary administrations, and build the local armed forces, first of all, it is necessary to enable the cadres going there to work to fully understand the Party's lines and viewpoints toward revolutionary campaigning in the ethnic minority areas. Only on that basis can the cadres engaged in mass campaigning correctly evaluate the mass situation and correctly understand the nature and characteristics of the task of motivating the masses to mop up the reactionaries.

By educating them with regard to the Party's revolutionary lines and ethnic minority policy, the Dac Lac Provincial Party Committee enabled the cadres and men to clearly realize that the true nature of the task motivating the masses to mop up the reactionaries and build revolutionary administrations is a revolutionary struggle of the masses, under the leadership of the Party, to smash the local reactionary forces. The cadres and men in the task units

are people who work with the masses in carrying out that struggle at the base level, people who bring the Party's lines and policies to the masses, enlighten and motivate the masses, and organize the masses to arise to struggle for self-liberation.

No matter in what form the control and deception of the reactionaries is hidden, it is impossible to hide its true nature: oppression of the ethnic groups, and class oppression and exploitation, which force the working people to live in misery. No matter what labels the local reactionary chieftains hide behind, most are exploiters and oppressors of the working people. Therefore, if the masses are enabled to clearly understand the lines and policies of the Party, it is certain that they will become enlightened and arise to struggle. That has been proved in the actual process of motivating the masses in village X.

After more than 3 months of educating the masses to enable them to distinguish between the enemy and ourselves, clearly recognize the true face of the armed reactionaries who divide the ethnic groups, clearly realize that the ethnic minority groups in Vietnam are brothers, and clearly understand the mission of the entire nation in building socialism, etc., so the people in the village underwent a clear transformation. The masses understood the revolution and had confidence in the revolution. We resolutely arrested the reactionaries in the counterrevolutionary organizations in the village, mopped up the armed reactionaries still operating surreptitiously around the village, and smashed the yoke of control of the counterrevolutionaries over the village people. The masses were more confident in the revolution. Many people became activists, bases of support for the work teams in mopping up the armed reactionaries, building and consolidating the revolutionary administrations, and building the mass armed forces. The revolutionary activity of the masses was developed step-by-step, and there took form a mass movement to persuade those who had gone astray and educate them so that they could return to their families to earn a living, and to punish the reactionaries who obstinately hid out. Some mothers went to find their children and encouraged them to leave the armed reactionary forces and return to the hamlet. When one person spotted some armed reactionaries when he was preparing a slash-burn field, he reported them to our armed forces and led them to the spot so that they could surround and capture them. Many youths worked with the armed forces in patrolling, guarding, and mopping up the enemy. Some people bravely and resolutely fought the enemy. The armed forces had a strong effect on the groups of reactionaries who were still hiding out. Sixteen of them reported to the revolutionary authorities. In addition to the movement to mop up the reactionaries, production was continually developed and the masses gradually entered collective livelihood organizations.

Those results enabled the cadres and men in the work teams to more fully understand the lines and policies of the Party and the policies of the Dac Lac Provincial Party Committee toward activating the masses, mopping up the armed reactionaries, and creating and consolidating the revolutionary administrations, the political associations, and the armed forces. The

cadres and men in the work teams had correct and profound awareness of the nature and characteristics of the task of motivating the masses and had confidence in and relied on the masses in attaining their goal.

2. Firmly grasp the relationship between the missions of the locality and the grasping of measures for motivating the masses to mop up the armed reactionaries, build the reactionary administrations, stabilize living conditions, and promote production.

The localities in which there are still armed reactionaries who are active and in control are also places in which the people live very miserably, production stagnates, the lives and property of the people are threatened and violated by the reactionaries, and the governmental organizations, mass associations, and mass armed forces are still weak. Stabilizing the living conditions of the people, mopping up the armed reactionaries, and building the revolutionary organizations are important, urgent missions which are closely interrelated. In the process of motivating the masses it is necessary to fulfill those missions simultaneously. Only by completely eliminating the reactionaries can we have conditions for waging mass campaigns, building revolutionary administrations, and maintaining order and security for the masses. But the armed forces and work teams alone cannot completely eliminate the armed reactionaries who blend in and hide out in the locality. It is necessary to campaign for the masses to arise to master their destinies and build administrations that are truly of the masses, for only then is it possible to manifest the strength of the masses in coordinating in mopping up the reactionaries. The tasks of stabilizing living conditions and promoting production must not be relaxed. The phenomenon of seeing only the mopping up mission, and not the other activities, must be avoided.

In order to completely eliminate the armed reactionaries, it is necessary to apply resolute measures, and not merely kill, capture, or appeal for the surrender of many of the enemy; it is also necessary to kill or capture the leaders. We must find and destroy the enemy's hide-outs and food and weapons caches. Sometimes the destruction of the enemy's hide-outs and food and weapons caches has a greater effect than the killing of hundreds of the enemy. Therefore, the mopping up measures must be truly rich and creative. It is not necessarily true that the use of large forces and large-scale fighting is the only good operational measures for mopping up the enemy. Many times the use of small forces to slip into the jungle, catch the enemy by surprise, stage ambushes, etc., is more effective than attacking on a large scale. Coordinating with the local people and militia forces is the best way to mop up the armed reactionaries and prevent them from controlling the people or forcing the people to supply them with food, and will result in their rapid elimination.

The armed reactionaries have, to one degree or another, family or village relationships with the local people. Sometimes they are local people who are coerced and deceived into following the reactionaries. Therefore, encouraging the masses to appeal for their relatives to return is a very important measure.

The building of revolutionary administrations, militia forces, and mass associations must also be achieved by appropriate measures, from a low level to a high level, corresponding to the results of each step of the process of motivating the masses, and by having the masses mature in the activities of the administrations and mass associations and in fighting to mop up the enemy. For example, when organizing the mass associations only such principal mass associations as those for youths and women, should be organized in the beginning. Sometimes it is necessary to begin with the organization of the hard-core forces. At first, those hard-core forces do all of the tasks involving governmental administration, the mass associations, and mopping up the enemy. Only when the hard-core forces reach a certain number should they be organized into administrative organs, mass associations, and militia forces.

The tasks of mopping up the armed reactionaries, building revolutionary administrations, and stabilizing the people's living conditions must have their own appropriate measures, but all are based on mass activation and close cooperation. Therefore, the organization of work teams to activate the masses must meet the requirement of simultaneously fulfilling many missions in a village. For example, work teams are not organized merely to mop up the armed reactionaries, and cannot consist only of cadres and enlisted men and serve the military missions. Those forces must be organized to serve all the other missions. When the enemy are being mopped up, they are forces which fight the enemy. When there is a mass campaign to restore production and stabilize living conditions, they are forces which help people build houses and harvest the crops. When they help the local people organize administrations and mass associations, they must be people who fully understand such tasks.

The true nature of mass activation is to enable the people to understand the revolution, believe in the lines, stands, and policies of the Party and state, become the masters of their home areas, closely unite with one another and with the revolutionary armed forces, and have confidence in the revolutionary forces. The work teams activating the masses are people who represent the revolution. The masses look to them to understand and join the revolution. Therefore, the exemplariness, consciousness of organization and discipline, and love of the masses of the units engaged in activating the masses have an extremely important effect. The troops eat, live, and work with the people so that the people can understand the revolution and realize the troop's true love for the people, so that there can be close unity between the people and the work teams.

Actuality has shown that the units which truly unite with the local people, maintain correct discipline toward the masses, and do not cause the masses to misunderstand the troops, will be able to activate the masses, wipe out the enemy, give rise to a movement, and attain high effectiveness in their work.

3. Rapidly train a corps of local cadres.

The process of activating the masses, mopping up the armed reactionaries, building revolutionary administrations, and stabilizing the living conditions

of the people is also a process in which we can discover people who are good, sincere, and loyal to the revolution, and who have the confidence of the masses. As they experience actual struggle against the armed reactionaries, the good people among the masses will develop and mature. If we rely on those people and have appropriate plans and measures to train them we can rapidly train a corps of local people. On the basis of that corps of cadres we will be able to build solid revolutionary administrations and strong militia forces and mass associations. In village X, we at first had almost no infrastructure, but after a period of activating the masses we were able to form rather strong hard-core forces. On the basis of those hard-core forces we were able to set up a revolutionary administration at the base level. The recently organized militia forces contributed positively in, along with the work team, mopping up the armed reactionaries, and served as the hard-core assault forces in restoring production. In some battles, the militia forces of village X fought independently to mop up the enemy and ambushed the armed reactionaries.

The experiences of village X demonstrate that in order to transform the hard-core forces into cadres it is necessary to make preparations, have plans, and assign people with that responsibility. Plans must be drafted and implemented to discover hard-core people and transform them into cadres in the course of the process of activating the masses to fulfill the missions. We should not wait until the missions are fulfilled before training a corps of local cadres.

In order to do a good job of meeting the requirement of training cadres in the process of activating the masses, it would be best if the work team included cadres from the governmental, mass association, and military sectors. Those cadres would be responsible for locating, guiding, and cultivating the hard-core forces, and for transforming them into cadres in their sectors. If conditions do not permit, or if most of the work team are members of the armed forces, people must be given training and assigned responsibility for training cadres for the sectors. Those who are assigned such responsibilities must study and be trained in the training of cadres for the sector for which he is responsible. For example, a person assigned to train cadres for the youth and woman's associations must study and firmly grasp the training guidelines, standards, and work contents of cadres of such associations. If something is not clear or if difficulties are encountered, he must request the opinion of the upper echelon.

The selection and training of cadres must be appropriate to the new situation in the locality in all regards. We must be very strict in enforcing the stipulations regarding the principles of the selection and cultivation of cadres. We must rely on the masses and not make political or organizational mistakes from which the enemy could profit.

4. Do a good job of educating the work teams regarding the revolutionary lines and viewpoints of the Party, and with regard to revolutionary determination, fighting will, sense of responsibility, and ability.

When it was preparing to send a work team to village X to activate the masses to mop up the armed reactionaries, build revolutionary administrations, and stabilize the people's living conditions, the Dac Lac Provincial Party Committee organized an armed work team made up of cadres from many sectors, with cadres and men of the armed forces acting as the hard-core. All of them attended a training class in the stands, viewpoints, and policies of the Party, the missions and contents of the task of activating the masses, and the work methods. The armed work team was appropriately organized and equipped so that it could combine fighting the enemy with activating the masses.

Clearly understanding their glorious responsibility toward the revolutionary enterprise, the cadres and men in the work team did not fear difficulties or sacrifice and manifested a high degree of determination to fulfill their mission of activating the masses to mop up the enemy. Many cadres who had fought continuously for decades on the Tay Nguyen theater worked arm-in-arm with the people of the Tay Nguyen ethnic groups to mop up the vestiges of the enemy troops and to build and strongly defend an area of the homeland that is strategically important in many ways.

The cadres and men in the mass activation work team created strong determination for themselves, were not impatient and temporary, and knew how to create an increasingly strong unit in the course of activating the masses. Everyone matured and progressed and many examples representative of the will to win of the revolutionary armed forces appeared in the course of the mass activation.

Activating the masses, mopping up the armed reactionaries, and building revolutionary administrations at the base level is a fierce, complicated struggle which is beset with many difficulties and hardships. That struggle demands that each cadre and enlisted man, and the entire work team, truly cultivate himself so that he may fully understand the revolutionary lines and viewpoints of the Party, have a strong fighting will, voluntarily observe strict discipline, and be capable of operating independently in many regards.

The leadership and command cadres must, on the basis of the actual work, the good deeds, and the deficiencies, learn the necessary lessons and promptly educate and cultivate the cadres and men. Only in the course of the actual work can the cadres and men understand clearly and correctly the revolutionary viewpoints and lines of the Party and review their levels, qualities, and abilities. In order to do a good job of educating and cultivating the cadres and men in the course of the work, the upper-echelon leadership, guidance, and command cadres must be fully informed about the specific work of the units. Only on that basis can they clearly understand what must be taught to help the cadres and men who are fulfilling the task of activating the masses. Ordinarily, the work teams and units engaged in activating the masses must disperse into small groups, sometimes with one person in each place. Therefore, the cadres and men must be educated and appropriately organized so that they can heighten their consciousness of voluntarily fulfilling their missions and observing work discipline. In addition to

teaching and cultivating a consciousness of self-discipline it is necessary to pay much attention to overseeing and supervising them in order to create conditions for everyone and all units to work in correct accordance with the lines and policies, avoid deficiencies and shortcomings in their work, and avoid violating discipline toward the masses.

The area of operations for activating the masses is a rugged, complicated jungle-and-mountain area. Furthermore, we do not have sufficient communications facilities. There are also many difficulties and limitations in assuring such essentials as staple foods, nonstaple foods, medicine, clothing, etc. The facilities necessary to assure good morale are also very deficient. That is a major weakness and difficulty which must be overcome or restricted as much as possible. The direction for resolving those difficulties is to improve the morale and self-reliance of each person and each work unit, while the leadership and command echelons must take the most positive steps to help the units. The problems which can be resolved must be resolved resolutely and rapidly. The deficiencies which can be overcome must be rapidly overcome.

In order to do a good job of educating the cadres and men in the course of their work, it is very important to maintain regular activities and strengthen the combativeness of the activities of the Party, the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union, and the work teams and units. After each battle, work cycle, or month, a meeting must be held to review the work situation and experiences, and so that the collective group can help one another to raise their ideological and work levels. The command echelons at the company, battalion, and regimental levels must firmly grasp the situation of the work team and units in order to guide, promptly correct, and help the work teams and units to maintain regular activities and improve their quality.

The actualities of mass activation in village X demonstrated that the enemy will seek all ways to oppose us. Their chieftains are very obstinate and cruel. Their acts and schemes of opposition are very wily and cynical. If the cadres and men in the mass motivation work teams are subjective, lack vigilance, and grow tired and want to rest, the enemy will immediately take advantage of those opportunities to oppose us. The enemy have inflicted many losses on the masses and the work teams not because the enemy are strong but because the cadres are subjective and lack vigilance.

Therefore, the Dac Lac Provincial Party Committee and the military command organs at the various echelons have paid much attention to cultivating and correcting the cadres and men in the mass activation units, so that they may avoid mistakes and deficiencies and undergo a strong transformation with regard to determination to fulfill missions and have a resolute and persistent attitude in their work. The Provincial Party Committee has confirmed that the mass activation task is very difficult. But if the cadres and men are enabled to be clear in their thinking, have a positive revolutionary attitude, and are cultivated and promptly guided by the upper echelon, all difficulties can be overcome and we will be certain to be able to activate the masses, wipe out the armed reactionaries, build revolutionary administrations, and stabilize the people's living conditions. If that could be accomplished in village X, one of the most complicated places, it could be accomplished anywhere.

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

PROBLEMS OF TRANSPORTATION AT THE FRONT OUTLINED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 8, Aug 79 pp 25-31

[Article by Senior Colonel Nguyen An: "Assure Military Communications and Transportation on the Main Line of Resistance"]

[Text] In war, communications and transportation in general and military communications and transportation in general, are extremely important parts of the task of assuring the mobility of forces, assuring rear services for combat and combat readiness, maintaining living standards, and developing production under all circumstances.

In the recent fighting against the Chinese aggressor troops, our soldiers and people manifested the combined strength of the entire country, of each area, and of each locality in order to rapidly increase the operational ability of communications and transportation, expand the network of national defense communications, assure the mobility of combat forces, and transport military goods and goods to meet the needs of the material lives of our soldiers and people in the northern border region.

From the experiences of the recent war, and on the basis of the requirements of the building of a strong defensive line that is prepared to rapidly smash all new acts of military adventurism of the enemy, we must especially pay attention to the following matters concerning military communications and transportation to serve the fighting on the homeland's main line of resistance.

1. Firmly grasp the new characteristics, high requirements, and great capabilities of the communications-transportation task in war to defend the homeland.

An extremely important characteristic of war to defend the homeland is that our soldiers and people have sufficient strength and determination to develop that strength in order to defeat the enemy on the front line, during the initial phase of the war. That characteristic determines that the military communications and transportation task must assure the most rapid transportation and meet all needs for weapons, food, ammunition, medicine, etc., of the front line, while assuring transportation for the

rear echelons, for only if the rear echelons are solid can the front line be strong. But it must be realized that transportation for the front line is an element with special characteristics and very demanding requirements that must receive special attention and be well resolved.

In general, in war to defend the homeland we have many advantages. We have a nation that is independent and unified, have an increasingly complete, and have many, increasingly modern transportation facilities. The entire nation is concentrating on aiding the front line, so the communications and transportation task must be responsible for the transportation of a very large volume of materiel for the front line, but at the same time the communications-transportation sector itself is aided by the entire nation, so it has very great advantages.

Furthermore, it must be realized that the front line along our country's northern border in war to defend our homeland faces the enemy. Ordinarily, the enemy troops engage in reconnaissance, espionage, and sabotage activities, and when war breaks out it is an area in which the enemy attacks feverishly and interdicts our communications and transportation. Therefore, we must not only strengthen communications and transportation for the front line, but must also organize skillfully and have clever tactics. Only then can we assure the transportation of large quantities rapidly, secretly, and safely.

Communications and transportation in people's war to defend the homeland at present, and communications and transportation in liberation war in the past, were and are sharp spearheads in the rear services. That is a fierce and complicated struggle, especially at the front. Transportation for the front line on the mainland is difficult, and transportation to and from the island lines is even more difficult.

Therefore, we must fully foresee both the advantages and the difficulties, in ordinary times as well as in wartime, and in each area, in order to have policies and measures for the military communications and transportation task which are appropriate to all circumstances.

In order to assure that the enemy are defeated on the homeland's front line, the military communications and transportation task must assure the transportation of a very large volume of materiel not only before war breaks out but also during the course of the war. It must assure the mobility of forces, bring troops, weapons, food, and ammunition from the rear to the front, and transport the wounded from the front to the rear. It must also closely coordinate with the transportation forces of the sectors and localities in order to assure the living standards of the people and the operations of the sectors in wartime.

The front line along our country's northern border is a rugged mountain-and-jungle area which facilitates the camouflaging of truck convoys, warehouse systems, cargo handling areas, etc., but is difficult because communications are not very well developed and many areas are not favorable for transportation by mechanized vehicles, especially when the weather is bad and the roads

are muddy. Some road segments are narrow and one-way, which creates obstacles for large-scale transportation.

That situation poses for the military communications and transportation sector, at the strategic, campaign, and tactical levels, the requirement of simultaneously doing a truly good job of fulfilling the missions of assuring communications and transporting very large quantities. No matter what the circumstances, the military communications and transportation organs and units at the various levels must also correctly carry out the operational guidance and command plans of the various echelons, assure continuous transportation, and assure uninterrupted lines of communication between the rear area and the front, and from the rear to the base-level units, the battlefields, and the soldiers. Even when no, or insufficient preparations have been made, every echelon must seek all ways to overcome the difficulties in order to organize the victorious fulfillment of the missions that are assigned in a very short, very urgent period of time. We should not, because of difficulties, shortages, or danger, lower the requirements or constrict the scope of operations. We must know how to concentrate our efforts on serving the strategic areas and the key units and localities. But it is also necessary to create our own forces and facilities in order to, under all circumstances, operate continually over a large area and be prepared to very rapidly change the direction of operations to meet the troops' very great mobility requirements caused by the very rapid changes on the battlefield, while at the same time coping promptly and effectively with all the enemy's fierce, insidious stratagems. These are problems for the strategic and campaign echelons alone but are also important guidance thoughts which must be fully understood and manifested in the activities of all army units supporting communications and transportation.

2. Urgently build and consolidate a strong communications-and-transportation battle status on the front line from the very beginning. At the same time, we must flexibly transform the battle status so that it is to our advantage, and destroy the enemy's interdiction throughout the course of the war.

Creating a communication-and-transportation that is advantages to us and destroying the enemy's interdiction is a content of the art of organizing and commanding communications and transportation. The strength of organization and of the transportation forces on the front line can be truly developed only in transporting under combat conditions, when they are deployed and utilized scientifically. They must both be appropriate to the operational plans and the developments of the combat circumstances, and be appropriate to the terrain, roads, climate, weather, and capabilities in the area. That communications-transportation battle status must be one of continuous, strong attacks, the transporting of large quantities under all circumstances, and the attainment of a status of mastery in assuring military communications and transportation. The battle status is one of creating the combined strength of the transportation forces, means, and facilities, of transforming the nation's communications-transportation potential into communications-transportation strength on the battlefield. It is the

battle status of close, harmonious coordination among the armed forces branches, between the mobile forces and the on-the-spot forces, between forces without and within the army, and between the central level and the local level, in order to form a fighting front and assure that the fighting is resolute and solid under all circumstances.

In order to create such a strong communications-transportation battle position, the important matter is to first of all organize and build an integrated road network that facilitates the use of road, railroad, water-borne, and air transportation means and facilities, and forces which effectively aid one another. At the same time, it is possible to develop many mechanized and nonmechanized facilities in order to move forces and material-technical cargo to the various areas and to the defensive zones and battlefields.

In deploying that battle status on the front line at present, we must develop to the highest degree the strength of the existing system of rivers, streams, railroads, roads, and maritime routes in order to rapidly increase the transportation forces and volume and promptly and fully meet the requirements of the combat readiness and combat missions of the soldiers and people in the area. Furthermore, we must know how to concentrate the intelligence and ability of the entire sector in studying, and recommending to the state, plans and measures for mobilizing, and using in combination, the state transportation forces and the military transportation forces at the various levels, and between the transportation forces of the sectors at the central level and the transportation forces of the localities, in order to build, consolidate, and improve the road network so that it can be appropriate to the strategic military plans. First of all, it is necessary to immediately concentrate forces on opening up lateral roads to connect the various zones and land transportation routes for nonmechanized transportation facilities to transport cargo brought in by mechanized transportation facilities and assure that it is brought to the localities and bases along the border, even in areas where there are no motor roads. At the same time, we must urgently further the surveying of rivers, streams, and river channels, and prepare wharves and storage yards to fully utilize the transportation of mechanized, semi-mechanized, and nonmechanized facilities. In some areas that are deep in the interior or far away, communications and transportation are easily interdicted, so it is necessary to prepare air-drop areas and places for airplanes to land, so that when necessary transport aircraft or helicopters may be used to drop supplies by parachute.

In order to create a solid communications-transportation battle status on the front line, it is necessary to, on the basis of the characteristics of terrain and roads, correctly discerned the enemy's offensive laws and, on the basis of the actual capabilities of our transportation forces, facilities, and warehouses, deploy and develop them appropriately. We must exploit experiences regarding the modes of deployment of communications and transportation that have proved highly effective.

We must assure that in each area the transportation activities are based solidly on roads that have been prepared--both old roads and new roads, and both open roads and camouflaged roads, with the deployment of defensive forces.

In each area, the transportation forces must be deployed both to the front and to the rear and adequately concentrated to assure the principal direction. Transportation must be scientifically decentralized; the campaign transportation routes must be connected with the tactical transportation routes. In the process of transportation in wartime, the military transportation forces must be sent to the front and the transportation forces of the state and the local people are mobilized to transport in the contiguous zones and to serve as reserve forces. The system of warehouses is deployed on the spot, at appropriate distances from the combat lines, with sufficient reserve stocks of all kinds and strong cargo-handling and warehousing forces.

The entire communications-transportation formation deployed in each zone must lie within the over-all formation of the rear services forces and be integrated, solid, mobile, deep, secret, and with strong points, and it must be securely defended.

When on the defensive, the transportation sector must assure the on-the-spot transportation of the full amount of basic supplies for each defensive line, defensive zone, and each strong point on the battlefield. Transportation forces and facilities must be deployed in areas bordering on the front lines, in order to reduce the transportation distance and time and continually create reserve transportation forces in order to be prepared to transport supplies or assure that our defensive forces can promptly carry out counterattacks. An extremely important matter is that we must prepare sufficient roads in each defensive zone, with many main roads and a system of lateral roads, in order to move cargo right up to the battlefield and to each defensive line. The mechanized and nonmechanized transportation forces and facilities must be fully utilized. The military transportation forces, the transportation forces of the state organs, and the transportation forces of the people must be closely combined, with clear division of labor and echelons. The local transportation forces and the transportation forces of the main-force units participating in defense must effectively support one another. There must be transportation plans for the areas behind enemy lines, in order to always be able to take the initiative when we and the enemy are in interblocked positions, or when a certain place is temporarily surrounded or cut off by the enemy.

In order to be on guard against the enemy infiltrating deeply to attack in the rear of our defensive line, our transportation forces and facilities must be deployed discreetly and secretly. The transportation units themselves must be capable of evading and fighting the enemy, in combination with the combat forces and backed up by a system of combat hamlets, villages, and wards, and on the military and self-defense forces along the route, in order to guard against and fight the enemy, to protect transportation, economize and maintain forces, and assure the capability to fight over a long period of time.

In attacks and counterattacks, the transportation formation must lie within the combat formation of the units in order to promptly move forces and

transport material-technical supplies in the course of the attack or counterattack. At the same time, it is necessary to remain close to the units fighting in the various areas, and to concentrate strong forces and facilities to support the main effort and always have supplies ready to move out rapidly.

With regard to transportation routes, in general we utilize the unit's tactical mobility routes, but we may also organize a number of separate transportation routes to facilitate service to the offensive spearheads and columns. The transportation units must remain with the road, their vehicles, and their cargo and always maintain a high state of transportation readiness. Before and during attacks and counterattacks, the on-the-spot and mobile transportation forces most closely coordinate with each other and assure a steady transportation pace.

3. Communications-transportation organization and command must be centralized, unified, and extremely flexible.

Military communications and transportation constitute a battlefield. The organization and command of communications and transportation must be regarded as combat organization and command. Organizing and using communications and transportation is the mission of the military commanders and the rear services commanders at the various echelons. The organization and command of communications and command in the border region is more difficult than in the lowlands.

In order to do a good job of organizing and commanding military transportation, all echelons must firmly grasp the principles, regulations, and stipulations regarding specialized, professional, and technical matters. Having gained experience recently along the border, we must strengthen and improve the drafting and management of transportation plans. The more urgent and complicated combat transportation is, the more necessary it is to have scientific plans. Of course, in actuality there may be many unforeseen transportation missions. But if we make the excuse of the unforeseen for not drafting transportation plans that fit in with the rear services support plans, we will be passive and confused.

The task of organizing coordination in advance and in the course of implementing transportation plans must be carried out in detail and meticulously among the various transportation echelons and forces within and without the army, between the transportation units and the cargo handling forces, and between the transportation forces and the forces assuring and defending lines of communication. Where there is little experience in transportation under combat conditions, it is even more necessary to stress those tasks, especially the tasks of coordinating and organizing the command and management of the transportation forces and facilities of the state organs and of the local people which are mobilized to serve the fighting. When war breaks out, there should be mobilized as many of those forces and facilities as are needed. They should be utilized very economically and with high effectiveness, and all-out efforts should be made to do a good

job of meeting the requirement of uninterrupted, two-way transportation. It is necessary to combine political mobilization with the organization and assurance of the policies and regulations, and with good material support, in order to create conditions for the mobilized transportation forces to effectively develop their forte of transportation to serve the fighting.

In the border region, in order to command transportation tightly and continually under the conditions of difficult terrain and complicated weather, it is essential that there be a network of uninterrupted communications and liaison consisting of radios, field telephones, and mobile communications. It is necessary to combine the use of the communications networks of the combat units and those of the rear services bases in each zone with the local posts-and-telecommunications networks. At the same time, it is necessary to study the provision of communications equipment that is appropriate for the command organs and the transportation units. We must organize on-the-spot command posts to promptly regulate traffic on the roads in the key areas, at the river-crossing points, and at places where cargo is received and sent at the main hubs. The comrades commanding the transportation units must adhere to the roads, to their missions, and to their units in order to directly command transportation on the roads.

If the command of transportation is to be centralized, unified, and flexible, it is also necessary to organize the tasks supporting communications and transportation very meticulously.

When war breaks out we deploy many forces, weapons, and technical facilities, and the quantity of cargo that is transported is enormous. Therefore, the pace of transportation is very urgent, the transportation forces are very great, and the transportation density is very great. Therefore, the task of assuring lines of communication must receive attention. There must be a division of labor in advance for each locality and each force responsible for assuring bridges, ferries, and roads at each location, and repair forces, facilities, and equipment must be made ready in advance. When necessary, it is possible to organize military engineer forces to facilitate transportation and escort the convoys, and military engineer forces to be responsible for river crossings during advances and at the field river crossing points.

At the river crossings, the key positions, the communications hubs, and the transportation routes passing through difficult terrain, the enemy may take advantage to attack and interdict us. Therefore, even while making preparations the various echelons must promote the building and deployment of infantry and anti-aircraft units to defend the transportation units, on a scale appropriate to each area of operations.

The task of assuring technical facilities and fuel must also receive adequate attention. Since the material-technical bases of our communications and transportation are still limited, the foremost concern is to develop and fully utilize all latent capabilities of the existing technical facilities, utilize them well, use them for a long time, and extend the useful life of

the technical facilities that have been provided. If that is done, even though we have few facilities we will still be able to transport a large quantity and promptly deliver ample cargo to the very battlefield and to the soldiers.

To transport during combat is actually to fight the enemy. Therefore, the communications-transportation forces, like the combat forces, must strengthen their fighting will and consciousness of organization and discipline, and must strictly enforce the professional and technical rules and regulations that have been promulgated.

The transportation forces have been and will be assigned combat missions on the border, the first line of the national defensive system, so they must be strong in all regards. The military transportation units of the military regions, provinces, regiments, and divisions must endeavor to become elite transportation units. All echelons and units must continually, day after day, tightly manage the roads and bridges within the sphere assigned it, firmly grasp the plots and schemes of the enemy, and always have healthy personnel and facilities that are in good condition and ready, in order to begin transporting immediately after receiving orders. When transporting, they must manifest their hard-core role to the highest degree, under all circumstances be worthy of being forces which do a good job of supporting the fighting, and have tight, strict organization and discipline, good techniques, and high productivity and quality. In order to develop the combined strength of the communications-transportation forces in wartime, we must also actively take the initiative in assisting and training the state and collective communications and transportation forces, so that they can grasp the relevant military tactical and technical matters, while also regularly carrying out maneuvers involving some or all units, along with training maneuvers concerning the operational plans to defend the locality. If those tasks are performed well, the military communications and transportation task and the military communications and transportation sector will undergo new transformations in all regards, and will brilliantly fulfill their mission of assuring communications and transportation for the front line, make successful preparations, completely defeat the enemy troops in the new fighting, and stoutly defend our homeland.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

'NHAN DAN' REPRINTS LAWS IN FORCE ON CRIMES, PROPERTY

[Editorial Report] Beginning in mid-October 1979 Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese began reprinting full texts of a number of laws and other directives currently in force concerning crimes and the protection of various types of property!

The 16 October issue, on page 3, carried the text of the "Law on Punishment of Counterrevolutionary Crimes" ratified by the National Assembly Standing Committee on 30 October 1967 and signed by DRV President Ho Chi Minh on 10 November 1967.

The 19 October issue, on page 3, contains the text of the "Law on Punishment of Crimes Against Socialist Property" ratified by the National Assembly Standing Committee on 21 October 1970 and signed by DRV President Ton Duc Thang on 23 October 1970.

The 23 October issue, on page 3, carries the text of the "Law on Punishment of Crimes Against the Private Property of Citizens" ratified by the National Assembly Standing Committee on 21 October 1970 and signed into law by DRV President Ton Duc Thang on 23 October 1970.

The 25 October issue, on page 3, carries the text of Circular No 954--TTg of the Premier's Office, dated 3 July 1956, concerning the protection of historical artifacts; the text of Circular No 55, issued jointly by the DRV ministries of education and culture and dated 6 November 1960, concerning the protection of cultural artifacts; and the text of Circular No 81-CP of the DRV Council of Ministers, dated 29 April 1966, concerning the protection of historical and art artifacts and of caves used during evacuation and air defense activities.

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